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THOlVIAS W. NEEL, as Executor, etc., et aI., Appellants,v.
MORRIS H. BARNARD, as Executor, etc., et aI., Respondents.
[1] Trusts-Express Trusts-Oonveyance With Agreement to Reconvey.-Where owners of property subject to foreclosurp
under trust deeds enter into a written contract with otie of
the creditors, in whom the owners repose great confidence,
by which contract they transfer the property to said creditor
to enable him to sell so much thereof as will liquidate their
indebtedness and thereafter to reconvey to them the property
remaining unsold, the contract is sufficient to create a vol~
untary trust and the creditor isa trustee and not a mortgagee
in possession.
[2] Id.-Express Trusts-Language of Instrument: Instruments
Oreating.-No particular language or terminology is necessary to create a trust; nor need the word "trust" or "trustee"
be used.
[3] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Liability Arising Out of Trusts.
-Where an action pending against a defendant at the time
of his death goes beyond an effort to follow and reclaim a
specific fund or specific property, and asserts a general liability against him, to be satisfied out of the assets of his
estate, arising out of a contract creating a voluntary trm;t
Ilnd making the defendant a trustee, the action is subject to
the provisions of Prob. Code, § 709, requiring the filing of a
claim against his estate.
[4] Id.-Claims-Actions-Proof-Variance.-Under Prob. Code,
§ 709, the holder of a claim against a decedent's estate cannot
maintain an action on any claim that he has not first presented
for allowance, and in any action brought he can recover only
on the claim which has been presented and rejected. The
claimant's cause of action arises on the claim in the form
in which it has been presented, and plaintiff is not permitted
to prove a cause of action other than or different from that
[2] See 25 Oa1.Jur. 286; 26 R.O.L. 1180, 1194.
[3] See llA Oa1.Jur. 706, 711; 21 Am.Jur. 579.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 48;[2] Trusts, §§ 27, 29;
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 476; [4] Decedents' Estates, § 570;
[5] Decedents' Estates, § 490; [6,10] Trusts, § 255; [7] Trusts,
§ 211; [8,12] Trusts, § 373 j [9] Trusts, § 377; [13] Trusts,
§ 359 (7).
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stated. in the claim, or to amend his complaint so as to sot
up liny other cause of action.
[5] Id.~Claims-Statemcnt of Claim.-A claim against a decedent's estate must sufficiently indicate the nature and amount
of the demand to enable the executor and probate judge to
act advisedly upon it. A claim for an accounting and for
damages for breach of duty as trustee does not cover a claim
for a repudiation of the trust and a consequent liability of
defendant's estate for the then value of the trust property.
[6] Trusts-Liabilities of Trustee-On Oontracts.-Where property is transferred to a trustee under a contract authorizing
him to sell so much thereof as may be necessary to liquidate
. the transferors' indebtedness, and conferring on him a large
amount of discretion regarding the prices, terms and condi"
tions of the sale, his mere failure to make a sale, even if
the price is adequate, does not necessarily convict him of a
brench of duty as trustee.
[7] Id.--,-Oontrol of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Oourt.
. -Where a. contract gives a .trustee the power to sell the
trust property for such prices and such terms and conditions
as he may deem proper, he is given an absolute discretion
whose exercise cannot be reviewed or controlled by any other
person or tribunal, on considerations going to the soundness
of the judgment exercised by him, in the absence of fraud
or bad faith. (See Civ. Code, § 2269.)
[8] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an action against a
trustee for failure to sell trust property under a contract
conferring on him the power of sale, the evidence supportl:ld
a finding that there was not an activo market for the disposal
of said property, where conditions of depression during the
time in question were well known.
[9] Id.-Actions-Appeal-Presumptions.-In an action agAinst
a trustee for failure to sell trust property under a contract
conferring on him the power of sale, even if an offer for the
property was made, it will be presumed on appeal that the
trustee in the exercise of his judgment deemed the price too
low, and the appellate court cannot say th.:tt he was guilty
of fraud or bad faith in declining to sell.
[10] Id. - Liabilities of Trustee - On Oontracts.-Even if the
.
proPerty transferred to a trustee, under a contract conferring
on him the power of sale for purposes of liquidating the
transferors' debts, could have been sold for enough to pay
;the debts and leave a substantial surplus, the trustee's failure to sell would not necessarily convict him of bad faith
or breach of duty, where it was not necessarily unreasonablo
[4] See llA Oal.Jur. 865-867.
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io~ hi~ to believe that the market would improve, and where
there was no evidence that the transferors urged the trustee
to close the property at the best prices obtainable or that
they were not satisfied to rely on his judg-ment. Mistnken
jUdgment is not necessarily unreasonable judgment, and
neither is the equivalent of bad faith.
[11] Id.-Actions-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-In an action
against a trustee for failure to sell trust property under a
contract conferring on him the power of sale, the issues of
fraud and bad faith were questions for the determination
of the trial court, and where its decision in favor of defendant
has adequate support in the evidence, such decision will not
be disturbed on appeal.
[12] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Su1liciency.-In an action against
a trustee for breach of duty with respect to real property,
subject to trust deeds, which had been transferred to him
under a contract authorizing him to sell the property, the
evidence supported a finding that his acquisition of notes secured by the trust deeds was done pursuant to the contract,
where he had been a payee of notes secured by trust deeds
of plaintiffs' land, and had sold them to others with his endorsement, so that upon plaintiffs' default he could be compelled by the holders to take them up, and where the motives
. Inducing plaintiffs to execute the contract, as recited therein,
were defendant's promise not to humiliate them by recording
a notice of default under the trust deed securing the money
which' he had advanced.
.
[13] Id.-Accounting by Trustee-Actions-Burden of Proof.On an accounting for a trust, the trustee has the burden to
establish the correctness of his accounts. This rule goes
merely to items in the accounts, and does not require the
trustee to anticipate and defend against charges of dereliction of duty and malfeasance which do not arise from anything on the face of the accounts. Nor does the rule remove
from a plaintiff the burden of proving charges of fraud and
malfeasance against the trustee.
. ,APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge assigned. Affirmed.
Action for an accounting, and for damages for breach of
duty by a trustee. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Don G. Bowker, Henderson & Churchill and James C.
Hollingsworth for Appellants.
Rogers & Rogers, John H. Alvord, Newlin & Ashburn and
A. W. Ashburn for Respondents.
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THE COURT.-A petition for hearing in this case was
gTanted to the end that further consideration be given to the
'contentions of the appellants. On such consideration, we
agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court
of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division Three,
and adopt as the opinion of this court the opinion of that
court prepared by the Honorable Hartley Shaw, Justice pro
tem. It is as follows: "This action was commenced by
Henry H. Neel, Thomas W. Neel, his son, and Dessie L. Neel,
wife of Thomas, against Chas. Barnard. After the action was
begun, plaintiff Henry H. N eel and defendant Chas. Barnard
died, the executors of their respective estates were substituted for them, and the executrix of the deceased wife of
Barnard was also made a defendant. In discussing the case
we shall use the terms 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' to refer
to the original parties, except as otherwise specially stated.
The present plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of
the present defendants.
"This action arose from a contract between the plaintiffs
and the defendant by Which, as plaintiffs claim and the trial
court found, the defendant became a trustee for plaintifIs,
and was based upon certain claimed breaches of duty by defendant as such trustee. The contract consisted of a letter
written by defendant to H. H. Neel and T. W. Neel, two of
the plaintiffs, dated December 23, 1930, and a more formal
agreement naming all the plaintifIs as parties of the first
part and defendant as party of the second part, dated December 26, 1930, and signed by all of them. The letter trans~
mitted the agreement to plaintiffs and referred to it in such
fashion as to make both, as the trial court found, parts of the
one contract between the parties. Also a part of the transaction was a deed, dated December 26, 1930, by which the
plaintifIs conveyed to defendant, without qualification or re~
striction of any sort, their real property hereinafter mentioned.
"At and prior to the time of executing this contract plaintiffs were the owners of approximately 245 acres of valuable
farming land in Ventura County, mostly used for the purpose
of producing walnuts, with some of it in beans and other
crops. Only 10 acres of this land were owned by plaintifIs
Thomas W. Neel and Dessie L. Neel, the balance being the
property of plaintifI Henry H. Neel, who was a widower.
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At the time of this transaction this land was subject to trust
deeds for money loaned to the plaintiffs, a large part of it
by the defendant but some of it by others, amounting, with
advances a1'30 secured by the trust deeds, to $228,260.92, as
of March 31, 1931, according- to the recitals of the agreement
above mentioned, which projected the balances to include
interest to that date. Payment of this sum and interest
thereon was in default, in part, the trust deeds were subject
to foreclosure, and plaintiffs were looking for some mode of
refinancing their debts or otherwise saving themselves from
the complete loss of their property which seemed impending.
"The letter and agreement above mentioned recited the
facts regarding the loans, the incumbrances and the default
in all the detail necessary to a complete statement, provided
for the execution of the deed above referred to, and declared
that plaintiffs had received no consideration for the deed.
By the agreement tbe plaintiffs gave the defendant 'full authority and power irrevocable to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any part of or all of said real property, or any interest or estate therein, in such pieces or parcels, and for
such prices and upon such terms and conditions as the pJl'ty
of the second part may deem proper, and to enter into contracts, and execute all papers as may be proper or necessary
in order to carry out and consummate said sale or sales, and
upon receipt of the purchase price, either in cash or part of
the purchase price in cash and the payment of the remainder
to be secured by a mortgage or deed of trust upon the property so sold, to execute and deliver to the respective purchaser all necessary and proper contracts, bonds and deeds
of conveyance for the lands so sold which are or may be
necessary or proper to fully carry out and complete the transfer of the property so sold and to be in such form and under
such conditions as the party of the second part may deem
proper. ' Plaintiffs also authorized the sale of personal property used on the realty and of water stock appurtenant to it.
In the agreement plaintiffs stated their 'confidence and trust
in the integ-rity and honesty' of defendant and their belief,
by reason thereof, that 'the disposition and sale of said rcal
property and the payment of their indebtedness .' .. can be
more expeditiously accomplished, at less cost, expense and
for a greater value than can possibly be made' on a foreclosure sale and that the proceeds of sale will probably be in
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excess of the debts 'if the management and sale of said real
property is intrusted to' defendant. The defendant agreed
'that when the proceeds from the sale of said real property is
ample and sufficient to pay the indebtedness herein described,
and the advances, costs and expenses in the care and management of said real property, he will then make a full report
and accounting" to the plaintiffs 'of all the receipts and disbursements made and upon approval and accepta.nce of said
report' the defendant will reconvey to plaintiffs 'all the real
property remaining unsold, if any; ... and upon acceptance
and approval of said final report . . . he shall be released
and discharged from all confidence created by the acceptance
of said grant to said real property.' Another term of the
agreement was that the proceeds of sales and the income' from
the property 'shall be applied to the payment of the indebtedness herein described, the interest to accrue thereon, and
the disbursements made by ... [defendant] in the care and
management of said real property, and for no other purpose.'
It was also agreed that defendant was to receive compensation
for his services. Pursuant to this contract defendant took
possession -of the property described in it and has held and
operated that property ever since, except two parcels which
he sold.
[1] "Defendant contends that this agreement did not
create a trust, but merely made of defendant a mortgagee in
possession. The trial court, however, treated defendant as a
trustee and we are satisfied that this view of the matter is
correct. It is true the defendant, in his letter, referred to
the fact that the deed was without limitation or qualification,
saying also 'I decline to enter into any trust agreement, or
declaration of trust'; but in this respect he was like Byron's
maid who 'whispering "she would ne'er consent," consented.'
The defendant was not even named as the lender and beneficiary in some of the trust deeds recited in the agreement,
and many of the notes originally made to him as payee had
at the date of the agreement been transferred to others. The
powers given him by the contract far exceeded those of a
mortgagee in possession. The relationship created by the
contract has all the earmarks of a voluntary trust and must
be so regarded. There is a transfer of property by plain~
tiffs to defendant, motivated by their personal confidence re,
posed in him, for the purpose of enabling him to carry out
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certain purposes for the benefit of plaintiffs as well as the
holders of the indebtedness, which is voluntarily accepted by
defendant, and he assumes an obligation to carry out these
purposes, subject of course to the discretion provided for in
the agreement; all in writing. T1;J.is is sufficient to create a
voluntary trust and make defendant a trustee. (Civ. Code,
§§ 852, 2216, 2219, 2221, 2222.) [2] No particular language or terminology is necessary to create a trust; nor need
the word 'trust' or 'trustee' be used. (Weiner v. Mullaney
(1943), 59 Cal.App.2d 620, 631 [140 P.2d 704].)
"Many of the points made by appellants are based upon
the claim, which permeates their briefs, that the defendant,
a short time after the trust was created, repudiated and abandoned it, claimed the trust property as his own and from
that time forward treated the property as if there were no
trust and the conveyance to him had been absolute, the plaintiffs further asserting that by such conduct defendant committed a conversion of the trust property and must be charged
with the value of the propery as of the date of repudiation.
In reply the respondents contend that this claim of appellants is not within the scope of the complaint filed by plaintiffs or of the claim presented to the estate of the original
defendant. These two points merge into one, for when, by
reason of the death of the original defendant before the trial,
it became necessary to file a claim against his estate (Prob.
Code, § 709) the claim filed was simply a copy of the plaintiffs' complaint herein. There is no room here for the application of the rule that prevails where an issue not made by
the pleading is tried by consent, even if that rule could be
applied to a variance from the claim filed, for. defendant
made timely objection to the evidence on which appellants
found their contentions in this matter.
"The complaint contained two statements of causes of action. The first alleged the creation of the trust, stating the
surrounding circumstances including defendant's superior
knowledge and skill in the management and sale of property
such as that of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' great trust and con~
fidence in defendant, setting forth copies of defendant's letter
and of plaintiffs' deed to him and giving what the plaintiffs
understood to be the legal effect of the agreement, a copy of
which they alleged they had been unable to find. This stated
,leM"Yw~ckf1f f.!1~ of'~e details of the actual
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agreement, did not differ from it in any respect material
the present inquiry. This count also alleged that defendant
had made two sales of described portions of the land plaintiffs had conveyed to him, and that he had received income,
rents and profits from the land conveyed to him which were
in excess of the costs of operation, that he had failed and
refused to render an account and plaintiffs had demanded
one. This count further alleged that defendant became trustee for the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs had done everything re~
quired of them by the contract, and that defendant had
'failed, refused and neglected to properly perform and discharge his duties as trustee, in that' he had failed and refused to account.
'
"The second statement of a cause of action began by incorporating the first. Then it alleged that by the contract
between the parties it was agreed that defendant would 'dili~
gently and expeditiously sell so much of said ... properties
as would liquidate and satisfy the said indebtedness then
owed by the plaintiffs; that by reason thereof it was the duty
and obligation of the said Chas. Barnard to sell transfer and
dispose of so much of said real properties within a reasonable time as would liquidate said indebtedness; that there
was at said time an active market for the disposal of said
real property, and at such prices as would have liquidated
said indebtedness then owed by plaintiffs and which would
have left a balance either in money or property for the plaintiffs of approximately two hundred thousand dollars.' Then
followed allegations that defendant had at various times not
stated received bona fide offers from cash buyers for various
parts of the property, which would have enabled defendant
to sell the entire property for more than $400,000, but he
'refused to sell, transfer and dispose of certain parcels of
said . . . properties' and if he had sold them plaintiffs
'would have been restored to the occupation and possession
of certain parcels of said real properties and would have
received the rents, issues, incomes and profits therefrom, and
all to plaintiffs' damage in the sum of two hundred thousand dollars.' The second count then alleged facts regarding
each sale made by defendant, showing that in each case the
sale had been made for much less than the market value, to
plaintiffs' damage in. the aggregate sum of $37,619.28.
Finally, it alleged that 'by reason of 'the£ailure, refusal and
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neglect on the part of said Ohas. Barnard to sell and dispose
of Raid real properties within a reasonable time after taking
the record title thereto,' interest on plaintiffs' indebtedness
had accumulated and increased in the sum of $100,000, but
if he had made sales within a reasonable time $85,000 would
have been credited thereon, to their further damage in the
:;um of $85,000. Prayer was for an accounting, that upon
the accounting defendant be required 'to pay, convey and
deliver to said plaintiffs property cash that may be due them,'
and for damages in the sum of $322,619.28.
[3] "The action, as characterized by the complaint, goes
far beyond an effort to follow and reclaim a specific fund or
specific property. It asserts a general liability against defendant, to he satisfied out of the assets of his estate, whatever they may be, and arising out of the contract pleaded.
It is therefore subject to the provisions of Probate Code,
section 709, requiring the filing of a claim where an action
is pending at the time of a decedent's death. (See llA Cal.
Jur. 706, 711, 712.) This conclusion is even more obvious
as applied to appellants' theory of a repudiation of the trust,
leading to a liability for the value of the property, for this
theory involves an abandonment of the property by plaintiffs.
"Neither of the causes of action stated in the complaint
constituting plaintiffs' claim said anything of a repudiation
of the trust. The first was solely and simply an action to
obtain an accounting. The second added to the first four
items of damage which plaintiffs sought to recover j that is,
$200,000 arising from defendant's failure and refusal to sell
the property for enough to liquidate plaintiffs' indebtedness
and leave them a balance of $200,000; $6,619.28 and $31,000
caused by defendant's sales of two properties for less than
their value; and $85,000 for interest, which accrued on plaintiffs' debts by reason of defendant's delay in selling. We
cannot see how any of these allegations even hints at, or can
be regarded by any sort of implication as including, a repudiation of the trust by defendant, with concomitant claim
to hold the property in his own right, free of any trust.
[4] "'The provision that the holder of a claim against an
estate cannot maintain an action thereon unless the claim is
first presented is equivalent to a declaration that !te cannot
'maintain an action upon any claim that he has not first presented for allowance, and that in any action brought he can
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recover only upon the claim which has been presented and
rejected. This rule is settled by a long line of decisions. Tho
claim as presented and passed upon is the foundation of the
cause of action. The claimant's cause of action arises upon
the claim in the form in which it has been presented; that is
the only action he may maintain, and plaintiff is not permitted to prove a cause of action other than or different
from that stated in the claim, or to amend his complaint so.
as to set up any other cause of action;' (llA Cal.Jur. 865~
867; to same effect see cases cited in notes to Cal.Jur.)
[5] A claim must 'sufficiently indicate the nature and
amount of the demand to enable the executor and judge in
probate to act advi:sedly upon it.' (Thompson v. Koeller
[1920], 183 Cal. 476, 485 [191 P. 927].) Applying these
rules to the present case, we conclude that the plaintiffs'
claim as filed did not cover their present claim of a repudi.ation of' the trust and a consequent liability of defendant's
estate for the then value of the trust property. There was
nothing in it to suggest that any such liability was to be asserted, and the executor was therefore not put in a position
to act advisedly upon the claim as now made. For this reason
we dismiss the claim of repudiation from our attention in
giving further consideration to the appeal.
"The complaint and the claim do, however, clearly present the point that it was the duty of defendant to sell, the
trust property, or so much of it as was necessary, in a reasonable time, that he failed to do so, and that by reason of
such failure the plaintiffs suffered damage. The trial court
put' a construction on the contract which contravenes plaintiffs' contention, in this finding: 'That it was not the duty
or obligation of Chas. Barnard to sell, transfer and dispose;
of so much of the real property involved herein within a
reasonable time as would liquidate said indebtedness, but
that it was his duty to offer said properties for sale at what
he deemed a reasonable and fair price in an endeavor and
an attempt to liquidate said indebtedness within a reasonable.
time and have a substantial sum left over to pay to the Neels,
or in case of a liquidation by sale of a part of the property,
to return the remaining properties to the plaintiffs.' We·
shall not undertake to decide whether the construction thus,
put on the contract in regard to defendant's duty to sell,
within a reasonable time is correct; for assuming :plaintiffs'
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construction to b3 the true one, that is, that it was the defendant's duty to make sufficient sales within a reasonable
time to liquidate plaintiffs' indebtedness, other findings and
other terms of the contract are such that an error in the
finding just quoted would not lead to a reversal.
[6] "Much of plaintiffs' argument on this point is based
on the further finding that the defendant had 'an opportunity to sell the 89 acre tract (part of the land conveyed to
defendant by plaintiffs) for a net sum of $133,000 (the offer
of $140,000 being subject to a 5 per cent real estate commission) which offer was made in January of 1931, and which
was refused . . .' This is coupled with the further finding
that 'at said time and place defendant offered to sell said
property to the same person for $150,000 cash, which offer
was likewise refused. That said offers and refusals were not
made in violation of the terms of the contract, but in the
exercise of an honest judgment and discretion made and exercised in good faith.' The contract, while it may have required
a sale within a reasonable time, conferred a large amount of
discretion on the defendant regarding the prices, terms and
conditions of sale. The question, what was a reasonable time,
is inextricably bound up with his exercise of discretion in
these matters, and the time might vary accordingly. Defendant's mere failure to make a sale, even if, as plaintiffs
contend was the case here, the price was adequate, as viewed
from the standpoint of the present and the information on
market conditions and trends now available, does not necessarily convict him of a breach of duty as trustee, for his
discretion would properly take other matters into consideration.
[7] "By the formal agreement defendant is given power
to sell the land 'in such pieces or parcels, and for such prices
and upon such terms and conditions as the party of the second part [defendant] may deem proper,' and in the letter defendant stated 'I must have the total and absolute control of
the entire property as to its care, management, recital [so
reads the record; per ha ps 'rental' is in tended] and sale or
as to the disposition of the proceeds from the income or the
proceeds or as to the disposition of the proceeds from a sale,
and certainly there must be no restriction as to a sale and
conveyance under such terms and conditions, as I may deem
proper for as to those matters, I am to be the sole judge.'
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By these provisions the defendant is given an absolute discretion, whose exercise cannot be reviewed or controlled by
any other person or tribunal on consideration going to the
soundness of the judgment exercised by him. (Civ.· Code,
§ 2269.) No doubt his exercise of this discretion could be
attacked for fraud or bad faith, but we discover no evidence
which requires a finding of fraud or bad faith, contrary to
the trial court's finding of good faith, in regard to the offer
mentioned in the finding above quoted. This offer was made
in January, 1931, within a month of the execution of the
contract between plaintiffs and defendant. There is evidence'
that real estate values in the vicinity of this land dropped
greatly in the latter part of 1931 and thereafter, but we find
nothing to show defendant was not exercising an honest judgment when he refused the price offered him in January of
that year.
[8] "Concerning the later failure of defendant to sell,
the court found' That it is untrue that on or about December·
26, 1930, or at any time thereafter, there was an active market for the disposal of said real property, but it is true that
there were only occasional sales of like properties, similarly
situated, and that there was not an active market for said
properties at any time subsequent to December 26, 1930, and
it is untrue that the defendants had an opportunity to sell
any or all of said properties at such price as would have
liquidated the indebtedness owed by plaintiffs to defendants
and which would have left a balance either in money or
property of plaintiffs of approximately $200,000.00 or any
other sums. That the two sales made by plaintiff were made
in the due course of business and were the only ones which
could have been made other than an opportunity to sell the
89 acre tract ... ' (here follows the finding already quoted
regarding this offer). Upon examining the evidence we see
therein sufficient support for this finding, which it seems unnecessary to set forth here, to the mere lengthening of this
opinion. Conditions of depression during the time in ques~
tion are so well known that little proof of them is necessary.
This finding while it does not directly pass upon the question
of reasonable time, does in effect dispose of it; for if the
property could not have been sold, on such terms as defendant properly determined, a reasonable time for sale had not
24 C.2d-14
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elapsed. Plaintiffs point to a letter of defendant written in
January, 1931, stating that he had declined an offer for a 24
acre tract. No details of this offer appear except the price,
and as to that the letter stated that defendant was holding
the land for a higher price. Evidently the trial court did not
accept this admission as proving the fact admitted, for it
found that no such sale could have been made. The trial
court was not bound to accept such an admission as conclusive of the fact, even though it was not directly contradicted.
[9] But even if the offer was made, it is to be presumed that
defendant exercised his judgment upon it and deemed the
price too low, and we cannot say he was guilty of fraud or
bad faith in declining to sell.
[10] "Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the properties could
have been sold for enough to pay the debts and leave a substantial surplus, defendant's failure to sell would not necessarily convict him of bad faith or breach of duty. It was not
necessarily unreasonable for him to believe that the market
would improve, and the court may well have concluded that
plaintiffs shared that belief. There was no evidence that
plaintiffs ever urged defendant to close the properties out at
the best prices obtainable or that they were not satisfied to
rely upon his judgment. It is true that they had no right to
control defendant's action, but the fact that they made no
protest against his failure to make sales indicates that they
did not then question either his good faith or his good judgment. Furthermore, mistaken judgment is not necessarily
unreasonable judgment and of course neither is the equivalent of bad faith.
[11] "In regard to this issue of fraud and bad faith,
which is raised as to all of defendant's acts in accepting and
carrying out the trust, and particularly as against the court's
finding 'That it is untrue that the defendant, Chas. Barnard,
acting as trustee or otherwise under the contract herein, has
failed, refused and neglected, or failed, refused or neglected,
to properly perform and discharge his duty as trustee,' there
are circumstances pointed out by plaintiffs which tend to cast
some doubt on defendant's complete bona fides, and if the
trial court had made findings in plaintiffs' favor on this
issue, perhaps they could have been sustained. But on a consideration of all these matters and of the evidence as a whole
we are of the opinion that the question was one for resolu-
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tion by the trial court and that its decision in favor of defendant has adequate support in the evidence and cannot be
disturbed by us. The record is so voluminous and consists so
largely of documentary matter that it would unduly prolong
this opinion to set forth even a synopsis of the evidence on
this point; we have, however, considered everything to which
our attention is directed by the parties, with the result already stated.
[12] "Complaint is made that defendant was guilty of a
breach of trust because he acquired the notes secured by the
various trust deeds incumbering the property deeded to him,
this being called the acquiring of an interest adverse to the
trust, which is prohibited by section 2233 of the Civil Code.
The trial court found that this was done 'pursuant to the
contract' between the parties, and we think this finding is
supported. Defendant had been the payee of notes amounting to $160,000 and secured by trust deeds of plaintiffs' land,
and had sold them to others with his endorsement, so that
upon the defa:ult which is recited in the contract he could be
compelled by the holders to take them up. The motives inducing plaintiffs to execute the contract, as expressly recited
in the formal agreement, were the promise of defendant not
to humiliate or embarrass them by recording a notice of default under the trust deed securing the money he had advanced and their expectation that the proceeds of sales by
defendant would probably be greater than could be obtained
at foreclosure sales and greater than the amount required to
pay their indebtedness. The agreement also mentions dii:;bursements to be made by defendant in the care and man'age~
ment of the property. The defendant's letter transmitting
the agreement stated that' all my future investments will be
for the care and protection of the property' and that 'it will
be necessary to invest much additional capital before we can
complete the entire matter.' If defendant was to avoi.d the
recording of a· notice of default on the trust deed running
to himself, he must, of necessity, obtain the notes secured by
it; and the purchase of notes secured by other trust deeds
would be advisable and perhaps necessary to avoId the foreclosure sales, in accordance with the purpose of the contract.
[13] ,. Plaintiffs further complain that defendant should
have been required to assume the burden of proof on the ac~
counting. At the trial defendant presented an accoUnt and
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produced evidence in support of the items contained in it,
such as tended to show that the items of reccipts and disbursements were correct in amount and that the disbursements claimed were for proper purposes, and on this evidence
the court made and stated in its findings a complete account,
which differed in some respects from that submitted by defendant. Plaintiffs' point here is not, as we understand it,
directed at the proceedings on the account so stated and does
not involve the claim that evidence is lacking to support the
findings as to the items included by the court in its account.
The contention is, rather, that the defendant should have
been required to jUfltify affirmatively his failure to make
~;ales of the trust property. On an accounting for a trust, the
trustee does have a burden to 8stablish the correctness of his
accounts, but the rule does not go so far as plaintiffs claim.
Thcir main reliance in support of the claim is Purdy v. J ohnson (1917), 174 Cal. 521, 527 [163 P. 893]. That was an
action against trustees for an accounting and other appropriate relief. The trustees presented an account to the court.
and were cross-examined by the plaintiffs there in regard to
the items in it, but apparently produced no evidence in its
support. Of this procedure the court said: 'We think the
course pursued was irregular . . . The entire trial was conducted upon the erroneous theory that the burden of proof
was upon the beneficiary to point out the particulars in which
the account was erroneous, and that she was bound to go forward and establish affirmatively the impropriety of the
charges and credits which she assailed. Such is not the law
. . . in fact, the burden is upon the trustees to prove that
charges made by them are proper.' As a final statement of
the rule in this respect the court declared, at page 531, 'that
it is the duty of the trustees to support every item of their
account, and that wherever they fail to support the correctness of a charge or credit by satisfactory evidence, the item
mw;t be disallowed.' All of this the defendant here did. This
rule goes merely to items in the account. It does not require
the trustee to anticipate and defend against charges of dereliction of duty and malfeasance which do not arise from anything on the face of his accounts but are grounded on other
matters. It does not remove from a plaintiff who sues a
trustee on charges of fraud and malfeasance the burden,
which the law would cast on him in case of another defend-
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ant, of proving his charges. The trustee is entitled to the
benefit of the presumptions of regularity and good faith.
(See Estate of Vance [1940], 141 Cal. 624, 626 [75 P. 323] ;
B'urke v. Maguire [1908], 154 Cal. 456, 468 [98 P. 21].)
"Many other points are made and argued in the 762 pages
of briefs filed herein, but they relate to the contention that
there was a repUdiation of the trust and to the weight of the
evidence and a discussion of them here is not deemed necessary in a disposition of this appeal."
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
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CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES DOWN TOWN SHOPPING
NEWS CORPORATION (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Independent Contractors-Definition.-An independent contractor is a person who is engaged in an independent employment or occupation, responsible to his principal only for
the result and not for the manner or means by which it is
accomplished.
[2] ld.-Existence of Relationship-Control of Means of Work.In determining whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor, the most important factor is the right
to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result
desired. If the employer has the power to exercise complete:
control, an employer-employee relationship exists, whether or
not that potential control is exercised with respect to all
details.
[3] ld.-Existence of Relationship-Right to Discharge Workmen.
-The right to discharge an employee at will, without cause,
is strong evidence of the employer's control.
[4] Unemployment Relief-Employment-Right of Control.-In
an action against the publisher of an advertising sheet for
[1] See 13 Cal.Jur. 1014; 27 Am.Jur. 481.
[4] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Parts) "Unemployment Reserves and Social Security."
McK. Dig. References: [1] Independent Contractors, § 1;
[2] Independent Contractors, § 3; [3] Independent Contractors,
§ 5; [4-6] Unemployment Relief.

